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THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
CODIFICATION OR REFORM?
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ON June 11, 1946, President Truman affixed his signature to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,' climaxing more than a decade of agitation by groups
1. Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946) (hereafter cited by section
number only). For a chart of the Act's provisions see Appendix, infra p. 705. For other
comments on theAct see Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act
(1946) 41 ILL. L. REV. 368; Walkup, The Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 34 GEo. L. J.
457; Reich, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 8 FED. B, J. 7; Blachly and
Oatman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 34 GEo. L. J. 407; Blachly and
Oatman, Sabotage of the Administrative Process (1946) 6 Pun. ADMa. REV. 213. See also the
following articles in the American Bar Association Journal: The Federal "Administrative
Procedure Act'$ Becomes Law (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 377; Gwynne, The Archiltecure of the New
Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 550; Sellers, "Informal" Dispositions
Under The Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 646; Sellers, Exceptions as to
the Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 749; McCarran, Improving "Adminis-
trative Justice": Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 827;
1947] FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 671
in and out of the legal profession for some sort of "reform" in federal adminis-
trative agencies. Fulsome praise was heaped upon the Act by the president
of the American Bar Association,2 which was most instrumental in pressing
the legislation, and by many others.
3
With the growth in number and importance of administrative bodies in
the national government, created by the Roosevelt administration to carry
out its program of economic and social change, came the growth of the de-
mand that steps be taken to control the power of these agencies. In 1933 the
American Bar Association appointed its first Special Committee on Adminis-
trative Law.4 The first specific proposal to come from this group was the
bill for the creation of an administrative court. Following upon the heels
of that proposal came the report of the 1938 Committee,0 containing the
draft of a proposed bill, later known as the Logan-Walter Bill.7 Despite
violent opposition from the administrative agencies," the Logan-Valter Bill
was passed by Congress, but President Roosevelt vetoed the bill, remarking,
among other things, that legislation designed to reform administrative
procedure should await the report of the Committee appointed by the
Attorney General to study the problem.-
The final report of the Attorney General's Committee 10 in 1941 repre-
sents the outstanding survey of the administrative process in government
agencies. In addition to a description and evaluation of the procedures
Findling, NLRB Procedures: Effects of the Administratire Procedure Act (1947) 33 A. B. A. J.
14; The Agencies and the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) 33 A. B. A. J. 16.
2. "For our day it is in many ways as important as the Judiciary Act of 1789 was in
the founding of the Federal Government." Statement of Mr. Willis Smith, president of the
American Bar Association, quoted in (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. at 377.
3. Sen. McCarran: ". . . I do not believe a more important piece of legislation has
been or will be presented to the Congress of the United States than the one which I am
trying in my humble way to explain to the Senate today... ." 92 Cong. Rec., March 12,
1946, at 2195. A letter to the members of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York from Mr. Arthur M. Reis, the chairman of its executive committee, July 25. 1946,
hailed passage of the bill for "requiring these agencies for the first time to follow the -same
businesslike procedures which you and I find it necessary to follow in carr)ing on our per-
sonal and business affairs."
4. (1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 197.
5. S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
6. (1938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 331.
7. S. 915, H. R. 6324, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939).
8. See, e.g., the address by Judge Jerome Frank, then of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, before the Georgetown Law Alumni Club, Administratire Flexibility or rd.us-
trial Paralysis? quoted in Gm .uoRm, AmnmnmsTRATrvz LAW-CASns AND Co z=EN-rs (1940)
267 et seq.
9. H. R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d Sss. (1940) 3-4.
10. Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies-Report of the Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure, Appointed by the Attorney General, SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1941) (hereafter cited as the Final Report). The Committee also published a
series of monographs which examined the procedure of individual agencies. SEN. Doc. No.
186, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940); SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941).
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actually employed, the Final Report presented two bills, comprising the
majority and minority proposals of the committee, which were introduced
in the Senate." The war brought to a halt further action on these pro-
posals, but the present Act embodies many of the principal recommenda-
tions of the Final Report.'
2
Bills were introduced in Congress in 1944, which were the forerunners of
the present Act." No action was taken in the 78th Congress, but the pro-
posal was reintroduced in the 79th Congress in both the Senate and House.
14
The' judiciary committees of both houses carried on parallel work on the
legislation, calling upon administrative agencies and private organizations
and parties for their views and suggestions. 5 These recommendations were
embodied in revisions of the original text which appeared in a print issued
by the Senate Committee.' 6 The House Committee held hearings June 21,
25, and 26, 1945, upon all administrative procedure bills which had been
introduced.' 7 Further comment was sought by the Senate Committee on its
revised text and was analyzed by its staff, which published a second, more
elaborate print in June, 1945, with references and explanations.18 Finally
the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee and unanimously passed
by the Senate after very little debate," in contrast to the violent opposition
to the earlier bills. The House Committee made some minor changes,2 ' after
which the House approved the legislation,2' and the Senate concurred in the
modifications. 2  Both of these actions were likewise by unanimous vote.2"
A variety of material is available to assist in the construction of the many
11. S. 674, 675, and 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
12. The Attorney General's Committee recommended increased public information,
opportunity for presentation of views by interested persons in rule making, separation of
functions in formal adjudication, and independent hearing examiners, with more extensive
powers. Final Report 25-9, 102, 55-60, 43-53. "The published documents relating to the
present bill . indicate the care with which the recommendations of that committee
have been studied in framing the present bill." H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) 12.
13. S. 2030, H. R. 5081, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
14. S. 7, H. R. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
15. H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 14.
16. SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 5. The committee prints were not
published as government documents, but were made available for study in connection with
this comment.
17. Hearings before the Committee on the Jndiciaiy on Federal Administrative Procedure
and on H. R. 184, H. R. 339, H. R. 1117, H. R. 1203, H. R. 1206, and H. R. 2602, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945).
18. SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 5. Senate Judiciary Committee
Print of S. 7 (June, 1945) (hereafter referred to as Senate Committee Print).
19. 92 Cong. Rec.,-March 12, 1946, at 2208.
20. H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 49 et seg.
21. 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5773.
22. 92 Cong. Rec., May 27, 1946, at 5924.
23. For a suggestion that all was not so smooth as the vote indicates, see Blachly tind
Oatman, supra note 1, 6 Pun. Arm. REv. at 226 n.
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ambiguous features of the Act.24 Both the Senate and the House Judiciary
Committees presented extensive reports on the bilYl"5 In the course of the
debate on the floor of the House, the chairman of the subcommittee in
charge of the bill presented a lengthy statement of its purpose and opera-
tion.2 An unusual feature of the legislative history of the Act is that the
Attorney General presented his views of the meaning and probable effect of
each section of the bill, prior to its passage.27 Since this letter was appended
to the Report of the Senate Committee, it may be argued that the legislators
adopted it as an interpretation of the legislation, and thus is indicative of
the legislative intent.
The Act appears to represent a blend of three conflicting purposes. In
some respects it is simply a codification of existing law and practice; - in
others it prescribes a program of change addressed to agency discretion and
good faith; " and in other respects it is a statement of new law and stand-
ards of procedure to be enforced by the courts. 0 In many sections of the
Act it is difficult to discern which of these three purposes is intended.3' To
resolve these ambiguities, recourse to the legislative history will demonstrate
that the determination of legislative intent will apparently vary with the
source chosen as authoritative. In almost every case the opinion of the At-
torney General (representing the agencies, it seems) favors an interpretation
that the Act codifies existing practice or is addressed to agency discretion,
whereas the interpretation of Representative Walter is that the Act pre-
scribes new standards to be enforced by the courts. The two committee
reports do not offer much aid in construction of the more controversial sec-
tions. It is not surprising that those sponsoring the legislation should favor
a construction that would establish new standards of law; and conversely
those whom the Act is designed to control would favor maldng it as weak as
possible.
24. Of unusual utility is Adminfslratire Procedure Act: Legislatire History, 791h Congress,
1944-46 (1946) SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. It contains the Act, the Senate
Committee Print, the Senate and House Reports, proceedings from the Congressional
Record in regard to the Act, and a complete index by section.
25. SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H. R. REP. No. 1980,79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946) (hereafter cited as Senate Report and House Report).
26. Statement of Rep. Francis E. Walter, 92 Cong. Rec., lay 24, 1946, at 5752 d seg.
27. Senate Report App. B.
28. E.g., "No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order be issued except
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law." Sec. 9(a).
29. E.g., "Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter
presented to it except that due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the
parties or their representatives." Sec. 6(a).
30. E.g., "In every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing.... [no officer, employee, or agent en-
gaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any
case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recom-
mended decision, or agency review ... " Secs. 5, 5(c).
31. Secs. 6(c), 7(c), discussed infra pp. 688, 690.
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There are certain changes brought about by the Act, principally in the
requirements relating to public information and formal adjudication, par-
ticularly the provision for appointment of semi-independent trial examiners
under the supervision of the Civil Service Commission-but it is not be-
lieved that they are of so far-reaching a nature as to justify the laudatory
expressions to which reference has been made. 2 Much of the Act is simply a
codification of existing law or an expression of legislative preference for one
mode of procedure over another, to which the agencies are to adhere so far
as in their discretion and good faith they are able. Of course, the effect upon
agency practice of moral suasion should not be lightly dismissed. The Final
Report of the Attorney General's Committee had an immediate, though
limited, effect on administrative procedure; and even though it is held by
the Supreme Court that the Act does not prescribe new standards of conduct
which are enforceable in the courts, the agencies will presumably be anxious
to comply with the intent of Congress as unanimously expressed. 33 More-
over, where the Act is not entirely clear as to enforceability, agencies will
generally comply in order to avoid the risk of litigation.
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FOUR TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS
The Act defines four types of agency action, setting up procedural re-
quirements purported to be fundamentally different for each. The types are
defined by means of two distinctions, one between rule making and adjudica-
tion 34 and the other between formal proceedings and informal proceedings
(that is, between proceedings where decisions must be confined to a hearing
32. See notes 2 and 3 supra. Compare with those laudatory remarks the cautious'note
sounded by Mr. Louis G. Caldwell of the District of Columbia bar, who was chairman of the
American Bar Association's first Special Committee on Administrative Law in 1933, "IThe
bill] is a very modest program of reform, an almost irreducible minimum .... Any view-
ing with alarm might logically be expected from those who feel that the bill does not go far
enough, hardly from those who favor a minimum of restriction on the administrative proc-
ess .... Furthermore, every important sentence is hedged with exceptions and qualifica-
tions so as to seem to take care of any situation about which there is legitimate doubt."
From an address before the National Association of Women Lawyers, Feb. 7, 1945, printed
in (1945) 12 J. BAR Assoc. D. C. 59, 74.
33. That Congress may be amenable to further curbs on administrative agencies Is
indicated by an address by Senator McCarran before the 69th annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in Atlantic City, Oct. 30, 1946. The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated that "measured experience might indicate need for revision of the pres-
ent administrative system entirely." N. Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 31, 1946, p. 14, col. 1.
See also Senate Report at 30.
34. Secs. 2(c), (d). See also House Report at 17: "In stating the essentials of the differ-
ent forms of administrative proceedings, the bill carefully distinguishes between the so-
called legislative functions of adminiitrative agencies (where they issue general regulations)
and their judicial functions (in which they determine rights or liabilities in particular cases).
It provides quite different procedures for the 'legislative' and 'judicial' functions of adminis-
trative agencies."
[Vol. 56: 670
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record and where decisions need not be so confined).3 The four types are
(1) informal rule making, (2) formal rule making, (3) formal adjudication,
and (4) informal adjudication. 6
Before attempting to analyze the two distinctions, the Act's procedural
requirements for each of the four types will be examined. It is important to
discover just where the Act sets forth new law and where it lays down stand-
ards addressed to agency discretion or merely codifies existing law. The
provisions are set out graphically in the appendix to this comment.
Informal Rule Making. Except where the agency finds them inappro-
priate, notice and opportunity to participate must precede substantive rule
making of every variety.3 7 "Participation" may be limited to a written
statement. The statement must be considered by the agency, but it is
doubtful whether the courts will go far in investigating whether a particular
document has been considered.3 3 All substantive rules must include a state-
35. Secs. 4(b), 5.
36. Examples are: informal rule making: formulating labeling regulations for alcoholic
beverages under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act § 5(e), 49 STAT. 982 (1935), 27
U. S. C. § 205(e) (1940); formal rule making: regulating food standards under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701(e), 52 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 371(e) (1940);
formal adjudication: determination of unfair labor practices by the NLRB under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act § 10, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (1940); informal
adjudication: determination of veterans' claims under the Act of March 20, 1933, Title I,
§ 9,48 STAT. 10 (1933) [as amended 48 STAT. 525-6 (1933)1,38 U. S. C. § 709 (1940).
37. Section 4 reads in part: "(a) Notice.-General notice of proposed rule making shall
be published .... Except where notice or hearing is required by statute, this subetion
shall not apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice, or in any situation in which the agency for good cause finds
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or con-
trary to the public interest.
"(b) Procedures-After notice required by this section, the agency shall afford inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submicaion of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to present the mine orally
in any manner; and, after consideration of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpoe...."
The House Report paraphrased the exceptions in Section 4(a) as meaning all but substan-
tive rules. House Report at 24. So did the Senate Committee Print (at 6). "Substantive"
is defined neither in the Act nor in the committee reports. The Senate Committee Print
(at 6) stated that its meaning was established in law; it is usually considered as meaning
those rules which are legally binding on the persons to whom they are addressed. Final
Report 98-100. Examples given of "substantive rules" support this interpretation. Rep.
Walter, 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5755 ("price regulations"). House Report at 22
("statement of standards"). The new requirement would apply, for example, to the issu-
ance of tax regulations by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, heretofore issued without any
prior notice.
As to whether the requirements of participation may be omitted, see note 39 irfra.
See Nathanson, supra note 1, at 384, for a discussion of the extent to which agencies
are likely to omit these public procedures.
38. Section 8(b) calls for "consideration" of exceptions to intermediate decisions.
Interrogatories, virtually the only method of determining "consideration," have generally
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ment of "basis and purpose." This is new law, but apparently may be
omitted if no notice is given. 9 No substantive rule may go into effect until
thirty days after its publication or service upon all affected parties. 40 The
time requirement may be omitted, though, for "good cause."
The requirement that general rules which are not of legal effect--descrip-
tions of organization and procedure and policy statements-be published is
clearly new law.4'
Formal Rule Making. In formal rule making there are the same provisions
for notice and publication, or service, as in informal rule making. Participa-
tion, in contrast with informal rule making, is guaranteed, but only to
"parties." 42 A "party" is defined only as one "entitled as of right to be
admitted as a party." 41 The right to become a party must be found in the
statute governing te particular agency. Each "party" is entitled to submit
evidence and cross-examine, 44 usual rights of "parties" as defined under
existing statutes.
45
not been granted, despite the first Morgan decision [Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468
(1936)]. As regards the NLRB, for example, an interrogatory was granted in NLRB v.
Cherry Cotton Mills, 98 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), but it was denied in NLRB v.
Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Cupples Co. v. NLRB, 103 F.
(2d) 953 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); NLRB v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co. 98 .. (2d) 16 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938).
39. See supra note 37. Whether the requirements of participation and publication
with "basis and purpose" stated are governed by Section 4(a) is not clear from the statu-
tory language, nor entirely clear from the committee reports. The Senate Committee re-
ported that Section 4(a) "governs the application of the public procedures required by"
Section 4(b). Senate Report at 14. The same was stated in the Senate Committee Print (at 6)
except for the word "public." The requirement of publishing reasons is part of the same
sentence which prescribes participation. The Senate Committee also reported that Sec-
tions 4(c) and 4(d) applied whether or not public procedures were dispensed with-implying
that both requirements of Section 4(b) applied only when public procedures are used. Ibid,
40. Sees. 3(a), 4(c). The Federal Register Act already requires publication of all legally
enforceable general rules before they take effect. Sees. 5(a), 7, 49 STAT. 501, 502 (1935),
44 U. S. C. §§ 305(a), 307 (1940). See 1 C. F. R. §§ 2.2-.3 (1938). It is unlikely that sub-
stantive rules are more broadly defined in this Act than in the Federal Register Act. In the
Senate Committee Print (at 3) it was stated: "The definition of rule making and rule follows
essentially the definitions of the Federal Register Act. . . ." Accord: Rep. Walter, 92
Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5755. As to the confusing House additions of "particular
applicability" and "future effect," see infra note 66.
41. Some'doubt may arise as to the requirement of publication of SEC advisory opin-
ions as to the legality of specific transactions, but since the publication requirements apply
only to those interpretive rules formulated "for guidance of the public," advisory opinions
on a specific fact situation probably need not be published. Sec. 3(a). See statement of
Rep. Walter, 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5755. The SEC objected to the possibility of
compulsory publication, said it would virtually stop issuing advisory opinions if they had
to be published. A cautionary view as to the value of such broad publication requlrements
as the Act contains is found in Nathanson, supra note 1, at 381.
42. Sees. 4(b), 7, 8.
43. Sec. 2(b).
44. Sec. 7(c). The agency may permit only written evidence in some cases.
45. See FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S. 239, 242-6 (1943); Red River
[Vol. 56: 670
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The position of the trial examiner is set forth at length. The powers he is
given, such as to "dispose of procedural requests," are all new law, but in
most instances duplicate pre-existing agency practice. It is a new require-
ment that trial examiners be appointed, promoted, or discharged under
supervision of the Civil Service Commission. Section 11 describes the
procedure and will be discussed below.
Decisions must be made on "reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence." In reviewing agency action courts will probably interpret this to
mean no change in existing criteria.46
New legal standards are set forth in the requirement that there must be an
intermediate decision in all cases, but even here agencies may omit the inter-
mediate decision in special cases. 47 If there is an intermediate decision,
pai-ties may propose findings and make exceptions-new requirements, but
in accordance with most agency practice in formal proceedings. 43
Formal Adjudication. For formal adjudications, the Act sets up its strict-
est procedural requirements.A The content of notice to those affected is
specified; it restates existing law-" The hearing of formal adjudication is
exactly the same as that in formal rule making with two exceptions-the
separation of functions and the intermediate decision. By separation of
functions is meant that in any proceeding those who prosecute or investigate
may not associate in any way with the trial examiner." The intermediate
decision is different in that it must be written by the trial examiner and may
not be omitted.
5 2
There may be some question as to whether a party may waive any of the
requirements of formal adjudication. Since the general approach of Con-
gress, as indicated in the committee reports6 3 was to protect those affected
by agency action, it seems likely that all persons affected by a prospective
agency action could waive the procedural requirements of the Act. A provi-
sion in the Act to this effect would have prevented overcautious agencies
from deciding they must not deviate from the Act's procedures though the
persons involved are willing to waive some of them.
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F. (2d) 282, 285 (App. D. C. 1938). Statutes then-elves do
not generally define "party."
46. See discussion infra pp. 690-1.
47. Sec. 8(a). This subsection reads in part: ... in rule making... any such pro-
cedure may be omitted in any case in which the agency finds upon the record that due and
timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires."
48. Sec. 8(b) reads in part: "Prior to each recommended, initial, or tentative decision,
or decision upon agency review of the decision of subordinate officers the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit" findings, exceptions, etc.
49. Secs. 5, 7, 8. Fora discussion of § 5(d) on declaratory orders see Nathanson, supra
note 1, at 397-401.
50. GELLHORN, supra note 8, at 461 et seg., esp. 469.
51. Sec. 5(c). Cf. Nathanson, supra note 1, at 388.
52. Sees. 5(c), 8(a).
53. Senate Report at 5. House Report at 16.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Informal Adjudication. The Act lists no procedural requirements which
specifically apply to informal adjudication. Only the general requirements,
discussed below,54 have any application.
EFFECT OF RULE-MAKING-ADJUDICATIONDISTINCTION
Formal Proceedings. In settling the question of whether formal proceed-
ings are rule making or adjudication, the conceptual distinction between
the two is of limited application. Undoubtedly realizing the impossibility
of satisfactorily classifying many formal proceedings such as ICC rate
making and FCC radio-station licensing, the legislators settled the question
in many instances by specific enumerations and exceptions. Many proceed-
ings are in terms defined as rule making or adjudication. Another group are
exempted from the requirements which differentiate the procedures' of
formal rule making and formal adjudication-principally the separation of
functions-so that it does not matter whether they are called rule making or
adjudication.
Licensing is specifically defined as adjudication. 5 But initial licensing
proceedings, such as those where the ICC, FCC, or CAB issue certificates
of public convenience and necessity, are exempted from all the distinctive
procedural requirements of formal adjudication " 5-in other words, are
placed in exactly the same category as formal rule making. Enumerated as
rule making are rate making, price fixing, wage fixing, and matters relating
to corporate structure.5 7 Specifically excluded from the provisions requiring
separation of agency functions are matters concerning carriers and public
utilities. 5s
Where the conceptual distinction between rule making and adjudication
must be employed to settle the question of separating functions, only two
agencies have been noted which make rules in formal proceedings and are
therefore exempt. Those agencies are the Food and Drug Administration
when prescribing food standards 59 and the Department of Agriculture when
making rules under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act "-proceed-
ings where technical food problems are particularly important.
The extensive enumerations and exceptions, with a resulting limited ap-
plication of the conceptual distinction between rule making and adjudica-
54. See infra p. 687 et seg.
55. Sec. 2(d).
56. Separation of functions-§ 5(c); intermediate decisions-§ 8(a); written evidence--
§ 7(c).
57. "... the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or
financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or
allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of
the foregoing." Sec. 2(c).
58. ". . . proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or prac-
tices of public utilities or carriers." Sec. 5(c).
59. See supra note 36.
60. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 608(c)(4) (1940).
[Vol. 56: 670
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tion, place formal hearing procedures in a different light. Technical pro-
ceedings have been accorded the less strict procedures of rule making-
where decisions must be based on interpretation of masses of economic and
technical data. rather than on the unraveling of conflicting testimony as to
what a certain person has done.
61
Informal Proceedings. Notification, by service or publication, is the only
distinctive requirement of informal rule making over informal adjudication
which may not be omitted if the circumstances warrant. With so little
difference in strict requirements there would seem to be no strong reason
for employing what is confessedly a difficult conceptual distinction between
rule making and adjudication. A person is usually notified in some way of
any agency action which affects him. To require notification in some form
in all informal proceedings would not burden agencies. It would mean some
additional protection to private rights and would obviate need for the con-
ceptual rule-making-adjudication distinction in informal proceedings. The
other rule-making requirements-prior notice, participation, publication of
"basis and purpose," and delay before a rule takes effect-could without
burden be extended to informal adjudication, since they only apply to
agency action which is substantive (i.e., of legal effect) and can be omitted
if the circumstances warrant.
DISTINGUISHING RULE MAKING FROis ADJUDICATION
Despite the small practical significance of the conceptual rule making-
adjudication distinction, there will be cases in which it is important, and it is
therefore appropriate to examine the conceptual distinction between the
two types of agency proceedings-a difficult task because of the obscurities
in the text of the Act and the interpretative documents.
Under the Act a rule is (1) a statement, (2) of general or particular appli-
cability, (3) of future effect, (4) "designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy." 62 An order (the result of adjudication) is the "final
disposition" of any matter other than rule making and may be "injunctive"
or "declaratory." 63 The definitions are exclusive."
4
61. Such was the view of the Attorney General: "Proceedings are classed as rule
making under this act not merely because, like the legislative process, they result in regula-
tions of general applicability but also because they involve subject matter demanding
judgments based on technical knowledge and experience." Senate Report at 39. A blanket
requirement of the separation of functions with exception made to enumerated categories
too technical feasibly to permit such separation would eliminate the need for such a con-
ceptual distinction. A provision that an agency could declare certain types of cases too
technical for the separation of functions would be subject to judicial review for abuses and




64. House Report at 20: "The term 'order' is essentially and necessarily defined to ex-
clude rules." Senate Report at 11: "The term 'order' is defined to exclude rules."
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The trouble with the definitions is that any action fits both definitions,05
That rules must be of future effect supplies no distinction, for orders may
be both "injunctive" and "declaratory." In actuality all agency action
takes effect in the future. By any plain language test the distinction is
meaningless.6
To find a useful distinction one must look to the legislative intent. A
partially adequate line is found where courts have delineated between
agency action which must be preceded by notice and full hearing and agency
action not so required. Courts have with regularity termed the first type
"judicial" and the second type "legislative," 61 though writers have ques-
tioned the utility of the classification." Despite the fact that the labels have
nothing to do with court decisions and that cases employing the labels can-
not be reconciled on any such conceptual level, many parts of the legislative
65. E.g., an NLRB cease and desist order, presumably the result of adjudication, is
injunctive and final, so that it could be an order. Yet since the order is also a "statement,"
"interpreting" the Wagner Act, of "particular applicability" to an employer, of "future
effect" in ordering such action as dissolution of a company union, it could also be a rule.
66. That a rule could be of particular applicability and had to be of future effect was
added in the House version of the bill. In early versions rule making was general, adjudica-
tion particular, on its face a more orthodox distinction. House Report at 49. Fuchs, Pro-
cedure in Administrative Rule-making (1938) 52 HAnv. L. REV. 259, 263-5. The House
Committee purportedly added the two phrases to clarify the distinction, not to change it.
House Report at 49n. Rep. Walter, 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5755. Despite their
additions the House Committee continued to refer to rules as "general regulations." House
Report at 17. For perhaps the only way to regard these definitions see Nathanson, supra
note 1, at 373-7.
67. The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 583 (1927): "In the case at bar, the func-
tion exercised by the Commission is wholly legislative" (distinguishing a prior case demand-
ing stricter rules of evidence as "quasi-judicial"). Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States, 288 U. S. 294, 305 (1933): The tariff matter was a "delegation . . .of the
legislative process" (secret evidence could be considered); see (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 528;
(1933) 81 U. PA. L. REv. 764. State ex rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk
Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 523, 179 At. 116, 126 (1935y: "Such regulation is purelya legislative
function" (no notice necessary before a milk price order). Lexington v. Bean, 272 Mass.
547, 551, 172 N. E. 867, 869 (1930): "The by-law was quasi legislative in character .., 1
(notice and hearing not required before a local zoning ordinance was passed). See GELLUORN,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 360-3.
68. Hankins, The Necessity for Administrative Notice and Hearing (1940) 25 IowA L.
REv. 457, 463: "The language typically used by courts when deciding that notice and hear-
ing are necessary in a given situation is such words as 'judicial' or 'quasi-judicial.' If, on
the other hand, they are deciding that notice and hearing are not necessary, they may em-
ploy the terms 'legislative' or 'quasi-jegislative.' Such judicial name-calling seems to me a
mere verbal gloss, employed only after the actual decision is made." Davis, The Require.
ment of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1093,
1112: "[T]he attachment of separation-of-powers labels to functions is an evasion rather
than a solution." Holmes, J., in Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 197 (1933): Even
if the legislature could have made the order, "[t]here is an obvious difference between legis-
lative determination and the finding of an administrative official not supported by evidence"
(order to remove a grade crossing, made without prior hearing, declared invalid). See also
Note (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 332.
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history point clearly to a Congressional intent to peg the definitions of rule
making and adjudication to these very labels, "legislative" and "judicial,"
as they have been used by the courts."
For most agency actions the labels of "legislative" and "judicial" can be
attached by inspection of the decided cases. For the doubtful situations
legal writers have postulated a number of means of predicting judicial
response to any particular type of agency action." These postulates usually
call for consideration of (1) the number of persons affected, (2) the magnitude
of the effect on the persons concerned, and (3) the urgency of public need
for immediate action.7 '
The test suggested by the "legislative"-"judicial" labels fails in the case of
action labeled "legislative" (i.e., not requiring prior notice and full hearing)
which applies to named individuals. The legislative history of the Act in-
dicates that the term rule making is not to include all such agency action,
and suggests that where "legislative" action applies to named persons rather
than generally, it will be termed adjudication. -
69. House Report at 17. Senate Report at 7. Rep. Walter: "[V]e speak of rule or
rule making whenever agencies are exercising legislative powers. We speak of orders and
adjudications when they are doing things which courts otherwise do." 92 Cong. Rec.,
May 24, 1946, at 3755. A cease and desist order (supra note 65) is certainly adjudication
under the following, which refers only to adjudication: " 'Injunctive' action is a common
determination of past or existing lawfulness, although the remedy or sanction is in form cast
as a command or restriction for the future rather than as a fine, a-sessment of damages, or
other present penalty." House Report at 20. See statement of Acting Attorney General
Biddle at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the proposed bills: "First, there is
the rule-making process. ... Second, there is the adjudicatory proce s . . . rule mak-
ing is essentially a legislative function." Hearings before a Sub-Comrmilez of the Committee
on the Judiciary on S. 674, 675, and 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 1445-6.
A member of the House Committee on the Judiciary has recently expre-ssed a similar
view that the distinction is to be found in court decisions. Gwynne, supra note 1, at 551.
70. Hankins, supra note 68, at 463 et seg.; Fuchs, supra note 66, at 260-5; Davis, sura
note 68, at 1112 et seg.; Timberg, Administrative Findings of Fact (1941) 27 VAs. U. L. Q.
62, 76 et seg., esp. 82; Comment (1942) 55 HAV. L. REv. 427,490-1.
71. For (1) and (3) the greater is the number or urgency the more likely is it that the
label will be "legislative"; (2) works vice versa.
72. The Senate Judiciary Committee spoke of administration of veterans' claims as
adjudication, though they have been held a matter of "legislative ' grace. Senate Com-
mittee Print at 8. Van Home v. Hines, 122 F. (2d) 207 (App. D. C. 1941), cert. deied,
314 U. S. 6S9 (1941). Such an interpretation tends to make surplusage of the word added
by the House, of "particular" effect, except when a general regulation affects only one perron
merely because no other person is at the moment in the same status, a situation likely to
occur but seldom. No examples of rules of particular effect have been found in the legisla-
tive history of the Act. See supra note 66.
The inadequacies of this or any test show up in classification of the handling of vet-
erans' claims. Traditionally adjudication, they are placed by inference in the class of formal
adjudication by Section 7(c), where it is stated that in formal adjidications which determine
claims for "benefits" evidence may be entirely written. Yet courts are compelled to call
such proceedings "legislative" to justify the statutory exclusion of judicial review. The
proceedings may be likened to private bills in Congress. Van Home v. Hines, supra. The
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DISTINGUISHING FORMAL FROM INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS
Formal hearing procedures are set down in the Act to apply to agency
action, whether rule making or adjudication, whenever "required by statute
to be made [or 'determined'] on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." " This might appear to be a simple and clear line to draw between
types of agency proceedings. But an inspection of statutes governing agency
action reveals very few agencies which, by a literal reading of their govern-
ing statutes, are required to make their determinations upon the record of a
hearing. The Food and Drug Administrator "shall base his order only on
substantial evidence of record at the hearing. 7 4 The National Labor Rela-
tions Act requires that decisions in unfair labor practices cases be made
"upon all the testimony taken" at the hearing."5
A larger group of agencies, including the SEC, FPC, and FCC, comes un-
der the formal procedure requirements of the Act by only a slightly broader
interpretation, because of review provisions in their governing statutes
which require the reviewing court to confine its review to the record adduced
at a hearing before the agency.76 The agency must be able to justify its
order on the record or the order will fall, so that in effect it is compelled to
include in the hearing record all matter forming the basis of its order. In line
with this implied requirement agencies of this group have often specified in
their rules of practice that determination shall be made solely on the hearing
record.7
resulting dispositions fit the definitions of both rule and order, though it could be said that
they are not final. United States v. Gudewicz, 45 F. Supp. 787 (E. D. N. Y. 1942). For
further difficult examples see infra p. 699 el seg., on the classification of Immigration Service
functions.
73. Secs. 4(b), 5. The word "determined" is used for adjudication, "made" for rule
making.
74. See supra note 36.
75. Sec. 10(c), 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (1940). Federal Trade Com-
mission Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45(b) (1940): "The testimony . .
shall be reduced to writing. . . . If upon such hearing the commission shall be of the opin-
ion. . . ." Agricultural Marketing 'Agreement Act of 1937 § 1(e), 50 STAT. 246 (1937),
7 U. S. C. § 608c(4) (1940): "[The Secretary of Agriculture shall issue an order if he finds
. . . upon the evidence introduced at such hearing. . ....
76. The statutes provide for a mandatory hearing, the evidence before the reviewing
court being only the record of the hearing and of any additional hearing before the agency
which the reviewing court may order, and the agency's findings being conclusive "if sup-
ported by evidence." Securities Act of 1933 §§ 8(d), 9(a), 48 STAT. 80 (1933), 15 U. S. C.
§§ 77h(d), 77i(a) (1940) (SEC stop orders). Public Utility Act of 1935 §§ 205(e), 313(b),
49 STAT. 852, 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §§ 824(e), 825 (b) (1940) (FPC rate making).
77. Rules of Practice under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 9 C. F. R. § 202.20(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1943): "[T]he Secretary, upon the basis of and after due consideration of the
record, shall prepare his order. . . ." In apparent recognition of the Act's applicability are
the revised Rules of Practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission, issued on the day
the Act went into effect, 11 FED. REG. 177A-726 (1946) [designated 17 C. F. R. § 201.12(b)]:
"[T]he Commission shall determine the matter on the record, any briefs of the parties, and
any oral argument before the Commission."
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A third group of agencies are governed by statutes which require that
action be taken "after full hearing," 78 not "until a hearing shall have been
granted," -9 or the like,80 with no review provisions as in the second group.
With this group may be included agencies whose statutes have been inter-
preted by courts to require a hearing before agency action, though the
statutes do not in terms so provide. Among the statutes covering agen-
cies noted, only the immigration statutes, as regards deportation and fines
proceedings, have been so interpreted specifically 1 Other statutes may well
be subject to the same interpretation
8 2
First glance would indicate these agencies of the third group are not sub-
ject to the Act's formal hearing procedures, that is, are not required by
statute to confine decision to the record of the hearing. Some, however, were
clearly intended to be included8 3 The Senate Judiciary Committee said
in its report, by-passing the "record" clause: "The general limitation of this
section to cases in which other statutes require the agency to act upon or
after a hearing is important." 84 The House Committee reported similarly,83
and added, "A statute may, in terms, require a rule or order to be made
upon the record of a hearing, or in the usual case be interpreted as manifest-
ing a Congressional intention so to require, and in either s'ituation sections 7
and 8 [requiring formal procedure] would apply. .. .
78. Interstate Commerce Commission (rate making), 34 SrAT. 589 (1906), 49 U. S. C.
§ 15(1) (1940).
79. Post Office Department (revocation of second class mailing privileges), 31 STAT.
1107 (1901), 39 U. S. C. § 232 (1940).
80. 49 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 39 (1940): "after.notice and hearing" (viola-
tions of public contracts). 46 STAT. 703 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1337(c) (1940): "[The Com-
mission] shall ... afford such hearing.., as it may deem sufficient for a full presenta-
tion of the facts" (tariff recommendations).
81. No hearing is in terms required by statute before aliens are deported. 39 STAT. 889
(1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155(a) (1940). The Supreme Court has held that a hearing must pre-
cede the deportation, saying: "This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congre-s
here in question.. . . In the case of all acts of Congress, such interpretation ought to be
adopted as, without doing violence to the import of the words used, will bring them into
harmony with the Constitution." The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903).
Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454 (1920); Chew Hoy Quong v. htite, 249 Fed. 869
(C. C. A. 9th, 1918). As to fines, see note 175 infra and Lloyd Sabaudo Sucieta v. Elting,
287 U. S. 329, 336 (1932).
82. E.g., as to postal fraud orders, Pike v. Walker, 121 F.(2d) 37 (App. D. C. 1941);
50 YALE L. J. 1479,1481.
83. Examples of statutes which state that there must be a hearing, but which clearly
do not require formal procedures are found in Sellers, supra note 1, 32 A. B. A. J. at 647 n.
See also testimony of Mr. Sellers at a Congressional hearing to the effect that many statu-
tory hearings could not have been intended to be formal. Hearings, supra note 69, at 78-9.
84. At 16, referring to adjudication.
85. "This section is limited to cases in which other statutes require an agency to act
upon or after a hearing. . . ." House Report at 26. Rep. Walter: "The requirements of
section 5 are thus limited to cases in which statutes otherwise require a hearing... ." 92
Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5756.
86. House Report at 51. The statement was made as a footnote to a House change in
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As final arbiters of the intent of Congress, the courts have interpreted a
number of statutes in terms requiring only a "hearing" to call for decision
upon the hearing record. The case of Crowell v. Benson "I left no doubt as to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.88 The Su-
preme Court has squarely so held as to rate making by the ICC 89 and as to
deportation proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.9
The courts labeled these situations as "judicial" in character. Some agencies
themselves have by inference interpreted governing statutes to require
determinations on a hearing record.9'
On the other side, requiring no record decision and labeling the agency
action "legislative," is the interpretation accorded to the Tariff Act of 1930
in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States,92 where the Supreme
Court held that Congress had not intended to require determinations solely
upon a hearing record. In this case the stress laid by the Court on the
"legislative" label suggests that a different result would have called for a
different label. 93
It appears that where courts have considered the adequacy of agency
Section 4(b), substituting "statute" for "law," and evidences that the change was made only
for the purpose as stated, "to conform to the language used in the introductory clause of
section 5 respecting adjudications," and envisaged no change in substance. But see Report
of Attorney General: "[Section 5] is thus limited to cases in which the Congress has specifi-
cally required a certain type of hearing." Senate Report at 40. This conflicting interpreta-
tion of the Act cannot stand against so clear a statement in the House Report.
87. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
88. 44 STAT. 1435 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 919 (1940). TheAct reads: "After such hearing
is had . . . the deputy commissioner shall . . . reject the claim or make an award." The
Supreme Court said, "The statute, however, contemplates a public hearing .... An award
not supported by evidence in the record is not in accordance with law." Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22, 48 (1932).
89. I. C. C. v. Louisville and Nashville R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 91-4 (1913). The principle
was reaffirmed in The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 265 (1924), in which the Court
said, "To refuse to consider evidence introduced or to make an essential finding without
supporting evidence is arbitrary action." Accord, as to license revocation by the former
Federal Radio Commission, Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co., 46 F. (2d) 612
(App. D. C. 1931).
90. See cases cited supra note 81.
91. Rules of Practice of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 C. F. R. § 97.18 (Cum. Supp.
1943), redesignated as § 97.19, 8 FED. REG. 16889 (1943): "After the hearing the examiner,
on the basis of the evidence submitted, shall prepare a report and recommendation," which
is final unless appeal is taken. Rules of procedure of the Post Office Department in proceed-
ings to revoke second-class mailing privileges, 39 C. F. R. §§ 5.37bb-cc (Cum. Supp, 1943):
"Upon the basis of the hearing, arguments, and briefs the hearing officer shall promptly
prepare a report." Review by the Postmaster General is confined to the same. But see
Rules of Practice of the Public Contracts Division of the Department of Labor, where no
limit is placed on the basis of the decisions. 10 FED. REG. 8137 (1945) (designated 41 C. F. R.
§ 203.11).
92. 288 U. S. 294 (1933).
93. "What is done by the Tariff Commission and the Presfdent in changing the tariff
rates . . . is in substance a delegation . . . of the legislative process .... The inference is,
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procedure-using the labels "legislative" and "judicial" to signify the court
result-all agency decisions labeled "judicial" have been held invalid unless
made solely on the record of a hearing 4 It is often difficult to distinguish in
the cases between legislative intent and the constitutional requirement of
due process as the basis for the court decisions which require procedure more
formal than that set out in governing statutes, 5 but since the courts tend to
attribute due process of law to the statutes, it does not matter. Action
labeled "judicial" is therefore required by statute to be made on the record
of an agency hearing." Thus the Act gives these labels a double significance.
Not only does "judicial" signify adjudication, as pointed out above; 07 it
signifies that formal procedures are required.
"AGENCY"
With such understanding as is possible of the distinctions between rule
making and adjudication and between formal and informal proceedings, we
may next proceed to analyze the meaning of the term "agency," which pre-
scribes to what persons and groups the Act's procedural requirements apply.
The definition determines, first, the lateral coverage of the Act, for the
Act applies only to agencies. Government functions are carried on by many
and diverse groups, such as boards, corporations, "legislative courts" like
the Court of Claims, individuals like the President and Cabinet officers.
If the word "agency" includes all of these, each one must comply with the
procedures described above, depending on the particular type of action in-
volved, and with the general procedural requirements described belowPS
Section 2(a) of the Act defines an agency. It is "each authority (whether
or not within or subject to review by another agency) of the Government
therefore, a strong one that the kind of hearing assured by the statute ... is a hearing of
the same order as had been given by congressional committees when the legislative prece__
was in the hands of Congress ." which, the Court points out, required no determina-
tion on a record. Id. at 305.
94. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evide in7he Adninislralkre Proeiss (1942)
55 Hnv. L. Rtv. 364, 382 et seg. In United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry., 265 U. S.
274, 286-90 (1924), the Court held that rate-malting proceedings were adversary and there-
fore all evidence on which the Commission based its order must be in the hearing record.
Similar dictum is found in I. C. C. v. Louisville and Nashville IL R1, 227 U. S. 83, 91 (1913),
where the Supreme Court called rate maldng "quasi-judicial." In Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v.
Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 339 (1932) it was held that a party whose "rights" were being deter-
mined by an "administrative tribunal" was entitled to have testify at the hearing the doctor
upon whose certificate the party was being fined.
95. In United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274 (1924), cited supra
note 94, neither Constitution nor statute is mentioned. In I. C. C. v. Louisville and Nash-
ville R. R., 227 U. S. 88 (1913), cited supra note 94, an order not based on the record was
declared violative of both statute and Constitution. For a typically ambiguous case, see
Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
96. A similar conclusion is reached in Walkup, supra note 1, at 462.
97. See discussion supra p. 680.
98. See infra p. 687 et seg.
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of the United States other than Congress, the courts, or the governments
of the possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia." If "author-
ity" be taken at its plain meaning, as Congress undoubtedly intended that
it should,9 it includes all who act for the Government, subject to the specific
exceptions, be it President,' 0 corporations,' or an agricultural station.0 2
The Act excludes "courts" from its definition of agency. Reviewing courts
will almost assuredly interpret this to exclude the so-called "legislative
courts" 103 from the operation of the Act. That the Attorney General
specifically stated that these courts were within the exception to the defini-
tion of agency, 0 4 in the presence of no contrary indication,105 is sufficiently
conclusive of the legislative intent.
The term "agency" will produce little controversy in its lateral spread
because it is so all-inclusive, but it is important when it is used in Sections
5(c) and 7(a) to exempt the "agency" from certain requirements of the Act.
Section 5(c) excludes the "agency" 106 from the requirements of a separation
of functions. Section 7(a) exempts the "agency" 107 from the requirements
Y9. Senate Report at 10: "The word 'authority' is advisedly used as meaning what-
ever persons are vested with powers to act. . . ." Rep. Walter: "Whoever has the author-
ity to act with respect to the matters later defined is an agency." 92 Cong. Rec., May 24,
1946, at 5754.
100. The question came up in the hearings of the House Committee on the Judiciary
and was answered by Rep. Jennings, a member of the committee, in a hedged affirmative:
"Well, if it operates to forbid the President from operation as a legislative agency, I would
say that it is good law." Hearings, supra note 17, at 77. The President, of course, can issue
substantive rules. See, e.g., 49 STAT. 31 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 715(a) (1940) (empowering
the President to make rules to carry out the law prohibiting transportation of contraband
oil in interstate commerce).
101. Government corporations may exercise substantive authority just as any other
arm of the government. See New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 408 (1937).
Most government corporations can grant money or assistance, both of which are defined in
the Act as one of the modes of "relief" which "agencies" employ-suggesting corporations
may be agencies. Sec. 2(f). See supra note 99. See also, e.g., 47 STAT. 6 (1932), 1S U. S. C.
§ 605 (1940) (authorizing the RFC to make loans "[tlo aid in financing agriculture, com-
merce, and industry").
'102. In the borderline cases of small government bureaus or commissions, such as the
agricultural stations, the question of spread is largely academic because what little au-
thority these borderline groups have lies in the realm of non-substantive informal rule
making and informal adjudication, which are not hampered to any significant degree by
the Act.
103. Court of Claims, Court of Customs, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Tax
Court.
104. " 'Courts' includes The Tax Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the
Court of Claims, and similar courts. This act does not apply to their procedure.
Senate Report at 38.
105. Congress has specifically used the name "court" in statutes describing them. Like-
wise it has not been noted that any consideration of these bodies took place at the Con-
gressional hearings before passage of the Act.
106. "[O]r any member or members of the body comprising the agency."
107. Or "one or more members of the body which comprises the agency."
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that examiners appointed under Section 11 preside at formal hearings. If a
subordinate officer or board is considered an "agency," he or it may preside
at formal hearings I0 and be exempt from the separation of functions.
Suppose an agency authorizes a subordinate board or officer to exercise
authority which is final if no review is taken. The ICC may delegate to a
subordinate board what authority it has.1 3 Any agency may give final
authority to its trial examiner under Section 8(a). Are the board and the
examiner "agencies"? A literal reading of the definition says they are,110
but such an interpretation as to these two exemptions ignores the Act's
purposes. Since the basic plan of the Act is to protect private rights by,
among other things, requiring special examiners and the separation of func-
tions, it appears the clauses of exemption will be interpreted narrowly. The
reason for exempting the "agency" from the separation of functions and
from the trial examiner requirements is to retain policy coordination be-
tween the adjudicatory and investigatory functions, impossible if the con-
trolling board or commission cannot supervise both functions and preside
at the most important cases."1 Where reasons for exemption are not present,
as, for example, when the subordinate group has little responsibility for
determining policy, the courts will probably find the subordinate group not
an "agency" as intended by those particular exemption clauses,112 so as to
protect the basic requirements of separation of functions and the appoint-
ment of independent examiners.
GENERAL REQUIREmENTS
The four types of agency action have been defined and the requirements
for each discussed, including the problems created by the term. "agency."
The Act contains additional procedural requirements which are independent
of the type of agency action involved.
Publication of Agency Organization and Procedures. A definite change in
the existing law is the requirement that every agency publish a description
of its organization and its mode of procedure, 13 as is well evidenced by the
966-page supplement to the Federal Register for September 11, 1946, the
date on which this requirement went into effect.11 4
Right to Appear. Section 6(a) grants to any interested person the right to
108. A parallel problem lies in whether any board created pursuant to a statutory pro-
vision be permitted to preside at a hearing. See infra p. 700 et seg.
109. 54 STAT. 913-4, 49 U. S. C. §§ 17(2), 17(4) (1940).
110. They have authority and the Act specifies that an "agency" may be "within or
subject to review by another agency." Sec. 2(a).
111. The Attorney General's Committee was concerned with the necessity for retaining
consistency of policy at the top level. See Final Report 57-0.
112. This is undoubtedly true of the trial examiner and to a lesser degree of all subordi-
nate boards whose sole functions are to preside at hearings.
113. Sec. 3(a).
114. 11 FED. REG. No. 177, Pt. I (1946).
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appear before an agency or its representative in connection with any agency
function." 5 A new requirement, it should not, however, be a burden on the
agencies, for it may be disallowed where inconvenient.
Right to Counsel. Every "party" to an agency proceeding and every
person compelled to appear before an agency is given the right to have
counsel." 6 In investigatory proceedings by the OPA Administrator and
the Wage and Hour Administrator, counsel has on occasion been excluded,
and such action has been sustained by the courts.
17
Subpenas. Section 6(c) of the Act specifies that subpenas be issued to any
"party" upon request and upon a "showing of general relevance and reason-
able scope." Il The language seems to call for equality of treatment of all
parties and to that extent sets forth new law. Some agencies, such as the
NLRB, have discriminated in favor of their own attorneys in the method of
issuance of subpenas." 9 Such practice will necessarily be changed to the
extent that it affects the ability to obtain a subpena.
As to whether the Act creates a new requirement of showing "coverage"
prior to issuance of a subpena there is some doubt.2 0 The legislative history
shows a sharp conflict not settled by the Senate and House Reports.'' In
view of the favorable attitude which the Supreme Court has exhibited to the
exercise of broad investigatory powers by agencies,'2 2 despite the conflicting
legislative history it is probable that the Court will rule that the require-
ment of Section 6(c) as to general relevance and reasonable scope simply
codifies existing law.
Notification of Denials. Section 6(d) provides that agencies must give
115. Sec. 6(a) reads in part: "So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits,
any interested person may appear before any agency or its responsible officers or employees
for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of any issue, request, or controversy
in any proceeding (interlocutory, summary, or otherwise) or in connection with any agency
function."
116. See. 6(a).
117. Bowles v. Baer, 142 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
118. Sec. 6(c) reads: "Agency subpenas authorized by law shall be issued to any party
upon request and, as may be required by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing of
general 'relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. Upon contest the court
shall sustain any such subpena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is found
to be in accordance with law ..
119. See infra note 166.
120. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not require that
coverage be proved before a subpena is issued. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317
U. S. 501 (1943); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946).
121. The Attorney General stated specifically that the section simply codifies existing
law, citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501 (1943). 92 Cong. Rec., May 25,
1946, at A3154. Rep. Walter, on the House floor, cited the identical case as overruled by
Section 6(c). 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5757. The House and Senate Reports state
only that courts are to "inquire generally" into the coverage of the subpena and be satis-
fied that the agency could possibly find that it has jurisdiction. Senate Report at 20; House
Report at 33.
122. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946).
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notification, with reasons, whenever a request made in connection with an
agency proceeding is denied. 123 This section represents new law and necessi-
tates modification of procedure in some agencies, notably the NLRB as
regards refusals to issue complaints.
Termination of Licenses. Licenses may be terminated only if the licensee
has been given an opportunity to correct the conduct or facts justifying such
termination. 24 Excepted from the requirement is any case of "willfulness"
or where "public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise," leaving so
much latitude to the agency to omit the procedure that it is doubted whether
the provision more than addresses itself to agency discretion. 12
JuDICiAL REviEW
Though strong statements have been made about the Act increasing
judicial review of agency action,1 6 it would seem that the Act merely codifies
the pre-existing law of judicial review.' In at least three respects however,
there is some ground for asserting that the Act prescribes new standards:
(1) whether Section 10(c) enlarges the availability of judicial review, (2)
whether the requirement of decision in formal proceedings on "reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence" changes in any way the scope of judi-
cial review of formal proceedings, and (3) whether the requirement that
courts set aside agency action "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that
the facts are subject to trial de novo" in any way changes the scope of judicial
review of informal proceedings.
In some quarters it has been believed that the Act grants some rights to
judicial review which were not previously available. This belief is based on
123. Section 6(d) reads as follows: "Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole
or in part of any written application, petition, or other request of any interested perstn
made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or where
the denial is self-explanatory, such notice shall be accompanied by a simple statement of
procedural or other grounds." The limitations, "interested person" and "in connection
with an agency proceeding," are to be noted.
124. Section 9(b) reads in part as follows: "Except in cases of willfulness or tho in
which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, no withdrawal, suspension,
revocation, or annulment of any license shall be lawful unless, prior to the institution of
agency proceedings therefor, facts or conduct which may %warrant such action shall have
been called to the attention of the licensee by the agency in writing and the licensee shall
have been accorded opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful
requirements."
125. It is to be noted, however, that the agency, under section 9(b), must take final
action before allowing a "continuing" license to terminate, and that courts, under section
10(d), are authorized to maintain the status quo during judicial review, that is, extend the
license. The Attorney General stated these two provisions may represent new law, which
might be of some real help to licensees. Senate Report at 43, 44.
126. See McCarran, loc. cit. supra note 1.
127. So concluded the Attorney General. Senate Report at 43. Approximately the same
views are expressed in Nathanson, supra note 1, at 413-8, and Walk-up, supra note 1, at
473-6.
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Section 10(c), which reads, in part, "Every final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial
review." It is to be noted, however, that only persons suffering "legal
wrong" may seek review. 28 Since a "legal wrong" can only mean something
wrong in the eyes of the law and therefore subject to judicial redress, 29 this
section, of itself, undoubtedly adds nothing to the law." 0 The only legisla-
tive history on this point declares flatly that it restates existing law.' 3'
In formal proceedings the agency must decide upon "reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence." 132 Reviewing courts are directed to set the
agency action aside if it is not supported by "substantial" evidence: 31 By
the plain language of the Act as regards sufficiency of proof,it would seem
that though the agency is directed to decide on "reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence," the courts may not set aside the agency action unless
it lacks only "substantial" evidence. The trio of adjectives are in this view
addressed to agency discretion. This was the conclusion of the Attorney
General.1 4 The language of the committee reports does not exclude this
conclusion. 5 The "substantial evidence" rule has, of course, been well
established by judicial decision.' A second view of the effect of "reliable,
probative, and substantial" is that it is precisely what the courts have re-
quired of agencies in court decisions applying the "substantial evidence"
rule.3 7 This is the unequivocal interpretation accorded to the trio of ad-
jectives by the Senate Committee in the explanations of its second com-
mittee print.3 The House Report is not clear,'19 while the Senate Report
and Representative Walter declare that agencies must follow the rules of
128. Unless statutes specify otherwise. Section 10(a) reads: "Any person suffering legal
wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action
within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof."
129. See, for a sidelight, a double-talking discussion on this subject in the Senate, 92
Cong. Rec., March 12, 1946, at 2194.
130. Judicial review of Immigration Service deportation and exclusion orders lies only
by writ of habeas corpus, traditionally a disretionary writ. It is possible that the Act makes
issuance of the writ mandatory, but such a result is unlikely. The Reports indicate that the
common law forms of judicial review are not to be changed but merely to be made available
if no other is available. Senate Report at 26; House Report at 42.
131. Senate Committee Print at 19. Report of Attorney General, Senate Report at 44.
132. Section 7(c) reads in part: ". . . no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be
issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof as may be
cited by any party and as supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence."
133. Sec. 10(e)(5).
134. Senate Report at 42.
135. Senate Report at 28; House Report at 45.
136. See, for one of the best statements of the rule, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U. S. 197, 229-30 (1938).
137. Ibid.
138. Senate Committee Print at 14.
139. House Report at 36.
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decision of courts of law and equity.4 0 In view of the confused legislative
history it is probable the courts will favor the interpretations of the Attorney
General and the Senate Committee Print that the phrases merely restate
well-established law, since such a determination would accord with current
attitudes of judicial self-denial in reviewing the findings of administrative
agencies.
The third problem of interpretation appears from Section 10(e)(6) of the
Act, directing courts to set aside agency action if "unwarranted by the facts
to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de izoo." The term "trial
ie iwo" as usually employed by courts means a situation where the courts
try over again the entire matter and decide it as though the agency had
never made a decision. 41 Such a review could hardly be amplified by the
phrase "unwarranted by the facts." As thus interpreted, the subsection adds
nothing to already existing law.
There is some indication in the legislative history and subsequent com-
ment, however, that the term trial de noro meant more than courts have
usually imported to the term, that it included all instances of judicial review
where a party could bring in evidence other than the record of an agency
hearing-that is, all reviews of informal proceedings. 142 This less likely
meaning of the term still would probably add nothing to existing law. None
of Section 10 applies where the agency action is committed to agency dis-
cretion. Since decision as to the factual merits of a particular situation
before an agency lies generally in agency discretion when the agency is not
required to precede its decision by notice and full hearing, it follows that the
factual merits of an agency decision made after an informal proceeding are
not generally subject to Section 10 at all.'43 Even with the broader meaning
of trial de novo the clause can add little to the scope of judicial review. If
there are cases of informal proceedings where the factual merits are not a
matter of discretion, it is still doubtful whether "unwarranted" would be




One of the most fundamental changes brought about by the Act is the
raising and setting apart of the position of the trial examiner in formal
140. Senate Report at 22; 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5758.
141. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, 34-5 (1939). Cases cited in 42 Woans AND
PHRASES (Perm. Ed. 1940) 524-7. Trial de novo is apparently used in this sense in § S. It is
doubtful whether the legislators intended a different meaning of the word in § 10(e)(6).
142. Senate Report at 28. House Report at 45-6. Rep. Walter: "Where there is no
statutory administrative hearing to which review is confined, the facts pertinent to any
relevant question of law must of course be tried and determined de nero by the re-evieving
court," quoted and endorsed in Sellers, supra note 1, 32 A. B. A. J. at 648.
143. See supra p. 685.
144. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
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proceedings. In other than certain technical proceedings he is subjected to a
complete separation of functions. He is guaranteed full procedural powers
to conduct hearings. And by Section 11 he is set apart from the agency as to
appointment, promoti6n, and removal-placed for these matters under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Section 11 was the result of extensive discussion of the various means of
securing independent trial examiners. 4 It provides that examiners shall be
appointed by the agency according to the civil-service statutes and regula-
tions, be assigned to cases in rotation, be paid salaries prescribed by the
Civil Service Commission independently of agency recommendations, and
be removable only by the Civil Service Commission after opportunity for
hearing.!46
The Civil Service Commission, if it applies the procedures customary in
the appointment of federal employees, will prescribe standards of education
and experience to be met by applicants, and will conduct examinations and
interviews of those who meet the prerequisites. The Commission will
probably work with the agencies in formulating the qualifications to be
required. The agency will then make its appointment from the eligibles
certified to it by the Commission. Previous experience suggests that many
of the appointees will actually be selected by the agency, and appointed
after Commission approval is obtained. The effect of the new appointment
procedure will depend on the extent to which the Commission relies on
agency selections and advice, but it seems likely that the agency will usually
be able to appoint competent men of its own choice. 47
The promotion of an examiner to a higher grade or classification might be
considered either an appointment or the prescription of compensation,
effected by the Commission independently of agency recommendations or
ratings.148 The legislative history makes it clear that the latter was intended
by Congress. 49 Formally, therefore, full responsibility for the promotion
of trial examiners is thrust on the Commission. The Act suspends for trial
145. See Senate Committee Print at 21.
146. Section 11: "Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsist-
ent with this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency, as many qualified and
competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to sections 7 and 8,
who shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and shall perform no duties
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as trial examiners. Examiners shall be
removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and
determined by the Civil Service Commission . . . after opportunity for hearing and upon
the record thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by the Commission
independently of agency recommendations .
147. The Act is silent on the status of examiners now employed; presumably the Com-
mission will not require a large-scale replacement of present examiners.
148. "'The general rule is that in some instances promotion is considered as an appoint-
ment, but that in other instances . . . it is not so considered." FIELD, CIVIL SERVIcE LAW
(1939) 127.
149. The Senate and House Committees reported in identical language: "The Commis-
sion would exercise its powers by classifying examiners' positions and, upon customary
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examiners the efficiency rating system by which promotions of other civil
service employees are governed in part by supervisors' ratings. This is a
significant formal change in promotion practices, but the rating system's
importance in other agencies has been weakened because supervisors hesitate
to give low ratings which might endanger an employee's tenure or hurt his
feelings and self-assurance. The importance of the suspension of efficiency
ratings may be further minimized because the House and Senate Reports
make it plain that the Commission will be able to rely on the advice of the
agency, 50 so that the Commission, unless it adopts a strict seniority rule,
will necessarily listen to agency recommendations. The agency itself,
watching the work of the trial examiners from day to day, is the only group
capable of judging whether there is a reasonable relation between the com-
pensation of its examiners and the ability and diligence which they apply to
their tasks. The alternative of promotion by seniority alone does not appear
to be desirable, or to fulfill Congressional intent. It is more plausible to
assume that in general promotions will be made in accordance with agency
recommendations.
Section 11 provides that examiners may be removed only after a formal
hearing by the Commission.' The protection thereby granted is greater
than that afforded other civil service employees.1 2 Actual use of the
removal procedure is likely to be limited; in the past agencies such as
the NLRB have rarely found it necessary to remove examiners. Yet the
loss of the power to remove may deprive the agency of a valuable stim-
examination through its agents, shift examiners to superior classifications or higher grades
as their experience and duties may require." Senate Report at 29; House Report at 46-7.
150. "Agencies may make, and the Commission may consider, recommendations; and
the Commission might consult the agency, as it now does in setting up positions or re-
classifying positions, but it would act upon its own responsibility and with the objects of
the bill in mind." House Report at 47. A similar view is taken in the Senate Report at 29.
151. Supra note 146. "[The Commission] must afford any e.amimer an opportunity for
a hearing before acceding to an agency request for removal, and even then its action would
be subject to judicial review." House Report at 46; Senate Report at 29.
152. Civil service employes are only entitled to notice, with reasons, and an opportunity
to submit an answering statement. 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U. S. C. § 652 (1940). The Civil
Service Commission has no jurisdiction to review the findings of a removal officer unless it
is alleged that the removal was made for political or religious reasons, or that the statutory
procedure was not followed. Civil Service Commission Rule XII, S C. F. R. § 12.4 (Cum.
Supp. 1943). The Fiftieth Annual Report of the Commission contained official objections
to this restriction on its authority: "The Commission is constantly receiving complaints
of improper treatment in efficiency ratings, of unjust removals, suspensions, and other ad-
verse actions, but it is without power to take remedial measures except in cases of dismical,
and then only when it is alleged, with offer of proof, that the procedure required by the
civil-service rules has not been followed or that the dismissal was made for political or
religious reasons." Fiftieth; Annual Report of the United States Ciril Se, ce Commission,
H. R. Doc. No. 138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 11. There is no judicial review of the cause
of the dismissal, but an employee is entitled to a review of the dismissal procedure. Eber-
lein v. United States, 257 U. S. 32 (1921); United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390
(1906).
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ulus to the work of the examiners. The Act makes it virtually impossible
for the agency to remove an examiner. An agency is unlikely to try to
remove one except under the most intolerable circumstances. Proof of
good cause will be a slow and exacting task. The incompetence for which
the agency will desire removal will generally consist of intangibles such as
writing inadequate opinions, lack of alertness at hearings, and other short-
comings, which can be shown to Commissioners and courts, if at all, only
•by painstaking analysis of volumes of evidence and by comparison with the
work of other trial examiners. At times, the agency may find that an exami-
ner does not believe in the policies of the governing statute as interpreted
by the agency, and removal again will be obstructed by the difficulties of
proving the unmeasurable. Whatever the agency is able to do, l" 3 the re-
moval restrictions are likely to be one of the most painful parts of the Act,
and should add little to the protection afforded parties to agency hearings.15 4
By implication the Attorney General's Committee raised the question of
whether the Civil Service Commission is the appropriate agency to prescribe
standards for the appointment of trial examiners. The work of the Com-
mission in recruiting professional personnel has often been criticized as
attempting to measure quantitatively unmeasurable qualities, and as being
ill-adapted for the hiring of specialized civil servants.155 The Attorney
General's Committee recommended that a special Office of Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure have jurisdiction to review appointments and removals
of examiners.5'
153. Examiners must be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable, but an agency
would no doubt manage to avoid placing incompetent examiners on major cases, and the
carrying out of the requirements of the Act in this respect appears to be committed at least
to a degree to agency discretion.
154. The theory behind Section 11 is apparently that impartiality is best attained by
insuring complete independence of the examiners. Although impartial determination of
private rights requires that trial examiners be completely free from control by prosecuting
officials of an agency, it does not follow that they should be uncontrolled by members of
the agency. The duty of the examiners is not to act as they see fit, but to carry out the
policies of governing statutes as interpreted by the courts and the agency. Sincethe repu-
tation of agencies like the NLRB depends very largely on the competence and fairness of
their trial examiners, their incentive to maintain an able corps of examiners would usually
seem to be sufficient. On the other hand, it is probable, as the Attorney General's Com-
mittee pointed out (Final Report at 47), that public confidence would be inspired and
charges of the appointment of over-zealous examiners would be rebutted by the investiga-
tion and approval of the qualifications and capacity of the examiners before their appoint-
ment.
155. Particularly searching was the study made for the President's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Management, REEVES AND DAVID, PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN TIE
FEDERAL SERVICE (1937), esp. 22-4. For a discussion of experience with Civil Service
Commission classification of trial examiners in agencies other than the Labor Board, see
LANDIS, THE ADmINI:sTRATIvE PROCESS (1938) 104-5. The Commission and the adminis-
trative agencies have had particular difficulties with positions which are peculiar to one
agency. MERIAM, PUBLIC PERSONNEL PROBLEMS (1938) 72-3.
156. Final Report at 47. The Office was to have the functions of investigating agency
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Section 11, it appears, will have substantial direct effect only in hindering
the removal of trial examiners. The combination, however, of Section 11
placing beyond the agency's immediate control appointment, promotion,
and removal of trial examiners, of Section 8(b) guaranteeing the trial exam-
iner the powers necessary to conduct a hearing, and of Section 5(c) providing
for the separation of functions will undoubtedly make the trial examiner a
more independent and responsible person, and will probably make headway
towards perhaps the most important objective in formal hearings-attract-
ing better men to the position of trial examiner.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A horizontal analysis of the Act as it affects all agencies shows the limited
nature of the actual change that has been made in Federal administrative
law. A vertical analysis of two agencies, the National Labor Relations Board
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, will show the Act's even
more limited effect on actual agency practice.
The procedure of the National Labor Relations Board illustrates the
elaborate mechanism of formal adjudication. Compared to the Immigration
Service, the Board proceedings are few, and less than one-quarter of the
Board's cases reach the hearing stage; but in a few hundred unfair labor
practice cases each year the full ritual of adjudication is performed. These
proceedings serve as a model for outlining the impact of the Act on formal
adjudication.
Of the two types of procedures recognized by the Act, only adjudication
is important for the Board. The Board is authorized by the National Labor
Relations Act to make "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act," 117 but in interpreting the substantive
provisions of the Wagner Act it has proceeded case by case exclusively,
building up a body of precedents to be followed in making decisions. Its
procedural rules are published as they are issued or amended.lS
practices and maling recommendations to facilitate adoption of procedures which proved
satisfactory, in addition to reviewing the appointment and removal of trial examiners. Id.
at 193-8. An agency with the responsibility for assisting the agencies to do their jobs effec-
tively as well as protecting the rights of the trial examiners would be more likely to study
the special nature of the trial examiners' job and adopt its procedures accordingly, un-
hindered by precedent built up in recruiting less specialized personnel. And for a while, at
least, new agencies seem to approach their jobs with a zeal unachieved by settled organi-
zations.
157. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 156 (1940). This provision has been thought
by many only to authorize procedural rule making. Final Report at 98 n. 18.
158. "Rules of agency organization, procedure, and practice" are exempt from the
notice and hearing before issuance requirements of section 4 of the Act, Certain Board
rules, particularly those governing the handling of run-off elections in certification proceed-
ings might be called "substantive" rather than "procedural." An example is 29 C. F. R.
§ 203.56(c): "The ballot in the run-off election shall provide for a selection between the two
choices that receive the largest and the second largest number of valid 4-otes cast in the
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The Board's main functions are (1) the certification of collective bar-
gaining agents and (2) the prevention of unfair labor practices by the is-
suance of cease-and-desist orders after a hearing to determine whether there
have been such liractices. Certification, the most important in number of
cases handled,' 59 is exempt from the Act's formal-hearing requirements. 10
No necessary changes in present procedure have been noted.1"' Unfair labor
practice proceedings, subject to all the provisions of the Act affecting formal
adjudication, 11 2 already incorporate the main practices required by the Act.
Changes in Board procedure are made by the Act in only three respects,
two of which are minor and will afford little increased protection to those
taking part in Board proceedings. 6 ' In order to comply with the Act the
Board must accompany each refusal to issue a complaint with a short state-
ment of the reasons for the refusal. 164 Section 6(c), which requires agency
subpenas to be issued upon request and a showing of general relevance and
reasonable scope, may force the Board to discontinue its discrimination in
fav6r of its own prosecutors in the mode of issuance of subpenas. 10" The
Attorney General's Committee and the courts have criticized the Board
practice of issuing subpenas in blank to its own staff while requiring a show-
election, except as provided in this paragraph or otherwise directed by the Board." Rules
and Regulations, Series 4, 11 FED. REG. 177A-613 (1946).
The Board's organization must now be published also. Sec. 3(a).
159. Through June 30, 1945, 39,925 representation cases and 37,306 unfair labor prac-
tice cases were filed with the Board. Representation cases have steadily increased in number,
totalling 7,310 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, while the number of unfair labor
practice cases has decreased since 1942, only 2,427 being filed in the 1945 fiscal year. Ninety
per cent of the unfair labor practice cases and 73 per cent of the representation cases have
been closed before formal action by the Board. 10 NLRB ANN. R P. (1945) 6, 12.
160. Sec. 5. The exemption was not included in the original bill, but was added by the
Senate Judiciary Committee because the "determinations rest so largely upon an election or
the availability of an election." Senate Report at 16. The non-prosecutory nature of certifica-
tion proceedings, the need for expeditious handling, and the fact that questions of credi-
bility are not usually involved render inapt the formality attending the unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding and the use of specially trained impartial trial examiners.
161. The question as to whether a disappointed union may obtain judicial review has
not been decided in court. Since the question is one of legal standing, it is unlikely that the
Act settles the question. See supra pp. 689-90.
162. The definitions of "rule" and "order" in the Administrative Act are so vague that
they are not much help in classifying the Board's action. It is safe to predict, however, from
the discussion supra p. 679 et seg., that an unfair labor practice proceeding would be labeled
"judicial" and found to be formal adjudication.
163. See Findling, supra note 1, for a more detailed analysis of the effect of the Act on
NLRB procedure.
164. Sec. 6(d). The Board adopted this change in the rules published September 11,
1946: "If, after the charge has been filed, the 'Regional Director declines to issue a com-
plaint, he shall so advise the parties in writing, accompanied by a simple statement of the
procedural or other grounds. . . ." Rules and Regulations, Series 4, 29 C. F. R. § 203.15,
11 FED. REG. 177A-607 (1946). Provision for a similar statement to accompany the denial
of an application for a subpena was made in § 203.27, 11 FED. REG. at 177A-608.
165. See supra p. 688.
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ing of relevance from other parties.' The most drastic change will be in the
mode of appointment, promotion and removal of trial examiners, which
Section 11 places under the supervision of the Civil Service Commission.'T
One further matter may be thought to require change-the rules of evi-
dence. While the National Labor Relations Act provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling," I3
those rules are generally followed; the chief exception is that hearsay evi-
dence is often admitted.'69 The Administrative Procedure Act demands no
more.7 0
ThE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERvIcE
Iztroduction. Probably more than any other government agency the
Immigration and Naturalization Service sets in bold relief the most difficult
problems of interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Service is a cabinet agency performing largely adjudicatory func-
tions.' 7 ' As is typical of such agencies, in contrast with the so-called inde-
pendent agencies like the NLRB, the Service operates under a variety of
statutes, many of which date back to the 1880's and early 1900's.172 When
166. MONOGRAPH OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S Co.uTrTE on AwasA'rmwv
PRoCEDURE, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941) Pt. 5, at 19. Inland Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 109 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
167. See supra p. 691 et seg.
168. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U.S. C. § 160b (1940).
169. MONOGRAPH, op. cit. supra note 166, at 19.
170. House Report at 36. Senate Report at 22. See also discussion supra p. 690. As
to evidence and the correlative problem of official notice, see Nathanson, supra note 1,
at 40-6.
171. Although the Service is endowed with broad rule-making authority, it issues few
substantive rules. Those which it issues are primarily interpretative or descriptive of the
Service organization and procedure and are not specifically required by statute to be deter-
mined on a record. 39 STAT. 892 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 102 (1940); 43 STAT. 166 (1924), 8
U. S. C. § 222 (1940); 54 STAT. 675 (1940), 8 U. S. C. §458 (1940). However, although this
type of rule-makting authority is not subject to the hearing requirements of the Act, the few
substantive rules issued by the Service are subject to Section 4(a) relating to notice. In
accordance with this section, the Service, on September 11, 1946, promulgated a regulation
providing that all substantive rules will be issued after notice, and all interested parties
will be given an opportunity to participate in such rule malng under such conditions as
may be specified in the notice of the proposed rule maling.
172. The first important functions of the Service actually date back to the Act of Au-
gust 3, 1882, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to administer the immigration
and naturalization laws of the United States. 22 STAT. 214 (1882). By the Act of March 3,
1891, the Office of Superintendent of Immigration was established to assist the Secretary of
the Treasury in this duty. 26 STAT. 1085 (1891). By the Act of June 29, 1905, the duty of
administering the immigration and naturalization laws was transferred to the Department
of Commerce and Labor and was lodged in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
established for this purpose. 34 STAT. 596 (1906). Nith the separation of the Department
of Labor and Commerce into two departments in 1913, the Bureau v.-as transferred to the
Department of Labor and was split into two Bureaus, one for the administration of the
immigration laws and one for the administration of the naturalization laws. 37 STAT. 737
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these statutes were enacted, Congress was primarily concerned with the
substantive controls which should be imposed on aliens, and as a result the
procedures (if any) laid down in these statutes for the discharge of the ad-
judicatory work of theService contain few of the safeguards for the protec-
tion of individual rights which are found in the more recent statutes creating
federal agencies. The procedural safeguards which are accorded to aliens
today are largely the result of judicial construction of the statutes and ad-
ministrative policies.
It is on the level of the Service's regional offices that the great bulk of the
initial adjudicatory work is carried on. This work falls generally into three
broad categories: admission of aliens, deportation of aliens unlawfully re-
siding in the country, and preliminary investigation and consideration of all
applications relating to naturalization.
In regard to the admission of aliens, or the exclusion process as it is called,
the chief responsibility of the Service is to determine the admissibility quali-
fications of all aliens who attempt to enter this country. 1 3 The Attorney
General is given discretionary authority to make exceptions in certain
cases.174 The Service also administers the levying of fines on carriers which
violate the immigration statutes in the transportation of aliens to this
country. 1
75
Of these various duties, only the Service decision in regard to the exclu-
sion of aliens who are found to be inadmissible under the immigration laws
is expressly required by statute to be determined after a hearing. 7 6 In
practice the Service also conducts hearings in fines proceedings. This prac-
tice is not followed as a result of an express statutory command, but as a
(1913). In 1933, the two bureaus were reunited into the Immigration and Naturalization
Service [Ex. Order No. 6166, § 14, June 10, 1933, set out at 5 U. S. C. §§ 124-132 n. (1940)],
and in 1939 the Service was transferred to the Department of Justice under which it oper-
ates today. 5 FED. REG. 2223, 54 STAT. 1238 (1940).
173. 39 STAT. 875-8 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 136 (1940).
174. 39 STAT. 877 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 136(h) (1940); 43 STAT. 162 (1924), 8 U. S. C.
§ i13(d) (1940); 43 STAT. 157-9 (1924), 8 U. S. C. §§ 209-10 (1940).
175. There are five separate provisions in the immigration statutes which authorize the
imposition of administrative fines on transportation companies who bring aliens to this
country in.violation of the immigration laws: 39 STAT. 879 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 143 (1940)
(for bringing to United States an alien who was unlawfully solicited by the company to
emigrate); 39 STAT. 880 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 145 (1940) (for bringing to the United States an
alien subject to a physical or mental defect or afflicted with a loathsome disease); 39 STAT.
884 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 150 (1940) (for failure or refusal to furnish a list of alien passengers
on board); 43 STAT. 164 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 167 (1940) (for failure to detain alien seamen for
inspection by immigration authorities, or after inspection if so required by the latter); and
43 STAT. 163 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 216 (1940) (for bringing to the United States an alien who
has an improper visa). These provisions will hereafter be referred to by the United States
Code citation alone.
176. The statute provides that aliens about whose admissibility there is any doubt shall
be brought before a board of special inquiry for a hearing. 39 STAT. 886-7 (1917), 8 U. S. C.
§§ 152-3 (1940).
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result of administrative policy and judicial construction of some of the
statutory provisions under which fines are imposed.
1
As to aliens who are resident within the country, the service is responsible
for ensuring that no alien has entered illegally and that those who entered
legally are complying with the statutory provisiong relating to their conduct
while residing here. Those found unlawfully in the country are taken into
custody and deported. 7 s Although the statutes are silent as to the procedure
for such deportation, as a result of judicial interpretation of these statutes,
the Service is obliged to accord such aliens a formal hearing before they can
be legally deported. 7"
Although the Service is responsible for the administration of the Nation-
ality laws of the United States, the major adjudicatory work attached to
such administration is performed by the courts.18
Classification of Service Functions. The principal problem of applying the
Act to the work of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is the classifi-
cation of its various tasks as rule making or adjudication and as involving
formal or informal proceedings. Proceedings conducted by the Service to
determine the admissibility of aliens, their liability for deportation, and the
liability of carriers for violations of the immigration statutes are probably
all formal adjudications within the meaning of the Act.
Deportation, according to the strict terms of the statutes, need not be
preceded by any hearing at all. By direct court holding, however, a hearing
has been required with decision confined to the hearing record, the label
"judicial" being attached.' With that label it is formal adjudication.
182
The situation, however, is less clear with respect to the nature of the
administrative fine proceeding. Here again the statutes are silent as respects
the necessity for a hearing, and the Service has granted hearings.'8 The
case of Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting 184 held fairness demanded that deci-
sion be confined to the record of a hearing. This places the administration
of fines in the class of "judicial" proceedings and therefore of formal ad-
judication." 5
177. See, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 336 (1932).
178. See 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155(a) (1940).
179. See supra note 81.
180. 54 STAT. 1156, 8 U. S. C. §§ 733-4 (1940). Here the agency is subject only to the
mild requirements of informal adjudication, for it is exempted by Section S from formal
procedures because it is acting as the agent for a court.
181. Cases cited supra note 81. The Japanese Immigrant case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903);
Ex pare Hidekuni Iwota, 219 Fed. 610 (S. D. Cal. 1915), aff' d wiltout opinion, 244 U. S.
643 (1917); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924); and Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F. (2d) 927
(C. C. A. 9th, 1944), rev'd on othwr grounds, 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
182. See supra p. 670 ef seg.
183. The carrier, however, has no opportunity to cross-examine or submit rebuttal
evidence. 8 C. F. R. §§ 23.13-.17 (1938), redesignated 8 C. F. R. §§ 160.13-.17 (Cum.
Supp. 1943).
184. 287 U. S. 329 (1932).
185. Nor are the proceedings exempted from the formal requirements by being subject
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In cases of exclusion there is no question about the proceeding being
formal, for the statute calls in terms for decision on the hearing record.18
That exclusion proceedings constitute adjudication rather than rule making
appears to be clear because of their application to named individuals and
their similarity to "judicial" proceedings.
The remainder and greater portion of the orders issued by the Service,
and the Attorney General on appeal, are discretionary, and undoubtedly
need not be preceded by notice and a full hearing.187 With the resulting
"legislative" label they are informal proceedings. The additional factor of
particular applicability makes their formulation informal adjudication.
Effect on Exclusion Proceedings. Under the present practices of the Serv-
ice, all aliens are subjected to a preliminary examination as to their ad-
missibility immediately upon arrival in this country. If any doubt arises
as to their right to enter, they are detained for a hearing before a board of
special inquiry which is expressly provided for by statute for this purpose.18
These boards are composed of three members selected by the District Di-
rector from among immigration inspectors who have been designated by the
Attorney General as qualified to serve thereon. 8 9 The hearings before these-
boards are private, and the alien is not permitted to retain counsel. 10 The
decisions of the board are final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney
General.' 91
The Service will be required to permit an alien to retain counsel at the
hearing before the board 192 and, in addition, will have to clarify its prac-
tices with respect to the giving of notice to the alien of the agency hearing
and the reasons therefor.
193
The chief problem, however, with respect to the application of the Act
to the hearings before the boards of special inquiry arises in regard to the
to trial de novo. The facts as found by the Secretary of Labor may not be redetermined in
court. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 338 (1932).
186. 39 STAT. 887 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 153 (1940).
187. E.g., Nagle v. Naoichi Misho, 33 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); Stone ex rd.
Colonna v. Tillinghast, 32 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929). See supra p. 684. Cf. Link-
later v. Perkins, 74 F. (2d) 473, 476 (App. D. C. 1934).
Some of the many discretionary orders are: orders which the Attorney General is au-
thorized to issue admitting an alien who is otherwise inadmissible (supra note 174); rulings
on petitions and applications submitted by aliens for an extension of their stay or for per-
mission to depart and return (supra note 174); remission of fines on carriers [39 STAT. 896
(1917), 8 U. S. C. § 169 (1940)].
188. 39 STAT. 887 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 153 (1940).
189. 8 C. F. R. § 12.1 (1938), redesignated 8 C. F. R. § 130.1 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
190. 8 C. F. R. § 12.2 (1938), redesignated 8 C. F. R. § 130.2 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
191. 39 STAT. 887 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 153 (1940). For mode of judicial review see supra
note 130.
192. See supra p. 688.
193. There is no provision in the Service regulations for giving the alien notice of the
reasons for his detention prior to his hearing before the board of special inquiry. In actual
practice, however, the alien is generally informed in an informal manner of the questions in
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provisions of Sections 5(c) and 7(a) relating to the presiding officers and the
separation of functions. Section 7(a) exempts from the requirement of
special trial examiners (1) all hearings conducted by the "agency" and (2)
"specified classes of proceeding" conducted by boards "specially provided
for by or designated pursuant to statute." Unless the boards of special
inquiry are included in one of the two exemptions, the Immigration Service
will.be required to have the hearings conducted instead by single trial exam-
iners. The criterion laid down under the discussion of the meaning of
"agency" suggests that a board of special inquiry does not have sufficient
policy responsibilities to justify its classification as an agency.
104
There is considerable support, however, for considering these boards as
special statutory boards and therefore exempt from the operation of the
trial examiner system as required in Section 7(a). The exemption of such
boards was inserted in order to preserve special statutory types of hearing
officers who contribute something more than. examiners could contribute.
The committee reports indicate that the exemption should be strictly con-
strued, and in particular that statutory provisions authorizing the use of
employees or attorneys generally should riot be considered authorization for
exemption. However, some statutory boards listed by the Attorney General
in the Senate Report as examples of the exempted class seem to fall within
the group which the reports indicate is not exempted.ls The apparent con-
flict can only be resolved on the grounds that the statutes setting up these
boards did not authorize the use of employees generally but rather specified
that their members should be selected from among eligible employees desig-
nated as such by the agency head. Using this distinction as a criterion, it
would seem that the boards of special inquiry must be treated as within the
exempted category in view of their similarity to the boards specifically men-
tioned as exempt.
Even though the boards of special inquiry may be employed to preside in
lieu of independent trial examiners, they will nevertheless have to be re-
organized to comply with the provisions of Section 5(c), requiring separation
regard to his admissibility which gave rise to his detention. Section 5(a) clearly contem-
plates a more formalized procedure with respect to such notice than hitherto employed by
the Service and it seems obvious that the latter will have to alter its practice in this respect.
Until some evidence is brought out which would indicate that the alien vw probably not
admissible, it would be impossible for the Service to comply with the more formalized notice
requirements as envisaged il section 5(a). It is possible that when such grounds do appear
the Service could then be required to serve notice on the alien of "the matters of fact and
law asserted" against him and the alien could be accorded an opportunity to request a
continuance to enable him to prepare his defense.
194. See discussion at p. 687 supra.
195. The examples included the Marine Casualty Investigation Board, Board of Em-
ployes authorized under the ICC, and boards set up to review the rights of disconnected
service men. Senate Report at 41-2. The boards mentioned are composed of specially quali-
fied personnel to be appointed by the agency head. 49 STAT. 1381 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 239
(a) (1940); 58 STAT. 287 (1944), 38 U. S. C. § 693i (Supp. 1946); 54 STAT. 913-4, 49 U. S. C.
§ 17(2) (1940).
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of functions. These boards are not necessarily permanent bodies but are
established whenever the need for them arises. In smaller immigration sta-
tions, where the volume of exclusion proceedings is relatively small, the
members of the special boards have frequently engaged in both investigatory
and adjudicatory activities. Under Section 5(c) it would seem that the
Service must now confine the members of these boards solely to the duty of
hearing cases.
Effect on Deportation Proceedings. Under existing practices of the Service
in regard to the deportation of aliens,196 the Attorney General must first
issue a warrant of arrest for the alien against whom it is intended to bring
deportation proceedings. A copy of this warrant together with a statement
of the grounds on which it was based is then served on the alien. At the
same time he is informed of his right to retain counsel and of the date of the
hearing, which must be set at a reasonable time to enable him to prepare his
defense. The hearing is conducted before two immigration inspectors,
neither one of whom may be the inspector who originally investigated the
case unless the alien consents to his participation. In actual practice, the
inspector who originally investigated the case almost never participates in
the hearing regardless of whether the alien consents thereto or not.
The only change in this procedure which is necessitated by the Act will be
in reference to the personnel in charge of the hearing. 19 7 Under Section 7(a)
the agency will be required to assign examiners appointed in accordance
with Section 11 to conduct the hearings.
I Effect on Fines Proceedings. Though classified under the Act as formal
adjudication, fines proceedings have been of a summary nature. The carrier
is informd of the charge that it has violated one of the immigration laws
and is given 60 days to submit evidence as to why a fine should not be im-
posed.19 8 The carrier may appeal to and make oral argument before the
Board of Immigration Appeals.'99 The Act requires substantial changes in
this procedure. There must be a formal hearing, with independent trial
examiners, the separation of functions, and an intermediate decision 200_
all new procedures.
Effect on Discretionary Proceedings. The discretionary orders of the Serv-
ice, all of which fall inthe category of informal adjudication, will be subject
to only two minor new requirements. When any petition for an order is
196. See 8 C. F. R. Pt. 150 (Cum. Supp. 1943) as amended by 8 C. F. R. Pt. 150 (Supp.,
1943, 1944).'
197. The procedure for making an intermediate decision, as outlined in Section 8(a), is
already followed. The officer who presided at the hearing is required to submit a memo-
randum containing his summarization of the evidence, his conclusions of fact and of law,
and his proposed order. The alien is permitted to inspect the record and the attached
memorandum and to file exceptions thereto together with briefs if he so desires. 8 C. F. R,
§§ 90.3-.12, 150.7 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
198. See supra note 183.
199. 8 C. F. R. § 90.7 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
200. See supra pp. 676-7.
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denied, the agency must promptly notify the petitioner of the reasons for
the denial.2 1' And any interested person may appear before the agency in
regard to an order.
202
CONCLUSION
Therd can now be little doubt that the first wave of enthusiasm for the
Administrative Procedure Act as a charter of protection against government
bureaus exaggerated the changes that would be enforced by the Act. Most
of the Act either codifies existing law or addresses itself to agency discretion.
To an even greater extent it duplicates existing agency practice.
Certain definite new requirements have been made, nevertheless. The
Act's important changes in administrative law may be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) the trial examiner has been placed in a more responsible and in-
dependent position by Civil Service Commission supervision of his appoint-
ment, promotion, and removal, by guaranteeing him considerable procedural
powers at hearings, and by a separation of functions (in some cases) that
removes him from any influence of prosecutory or investigatory personnel;
(2) agencies are required to publish all general rules, even though of no
legal effect, including a description of organization and procedure; (3) public
procedures are required in most cases of substantive rule making; (4) all
parties to agency proceedings and all persons compelled to appear before
an agency are guaranteed the right to counsel; (5) subpenas must be issued
equally to all parties to agency proceedings; (6) in all formal adjudications
there must be an intermediate decision to which the parties may except; and
(7) reasons must accompany all denials of requests.
The Act's two fundamental distinctions, between rule making and ad-
judication and between formal and informal proceedings, are bound to
create litigation, for no discretion is given the agency to decide in which
category its proceedings fall. Whenever an agency uses a procedure less than
that of formal adjudication, there will be an opportunity for a disappointed
party or injured person to claim on judicial review that more formal pro-
cedures should have been followed. It has been seen how far from clear the
distinctions are. The statutory language in distinguishing rule making and
adjudication is absolutely useless and the legislative history goes little
201. See supra pp. 688-9.
202. See .supra pp. 687-8.
203. In addition to the two agencies discussed at length, it has been noted that the Act
will change SEC procedure only to the e-xtent of requiring fuller publication of advisory
opinions intended for general guidance and use of special trial examiners in formal adjudi-
cations. Though intermediate decisions have often been omitted in SEC formal adjudica-
tions, it is believed that in most cases they would be waived by the parties in the interest of
speedy disposition. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has been noted to be required only to
give fuller notice before malting rules (which notice may be omitted under special conditions)
and to employ special trial examiners in Alcohol Tax Unit formal adjudications. All tax
adjudications are exempted from formal-adjudication requirements by being triable de roro
in the Tax Court. Sec. 5. Senate Report at 28; House Report at 45.
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further than calling adjudications everything that is traditionally adjudica-
tion. The statutory language of the distinction between formal and in-
formal proceedings is unsatisfactory in that the use of the phrase "required
by statute" to be determined on a hearing record gives refuge to those
agencies whose statutes do not specifically require such proceedings, whereas
the legislators undoubtedly intended to include proceedings in which the
courts have decided that decision must be confined to a hearing record.
2 14
There is further opportunity for litigation in the exemption of the "agency"
from the separation of functions and from the requirement of special trial
examiners, because in the context of those exemptions it is clear that the
word "agency" does not include all it is defined to include in Section 2(a). A
like trouble may arise in the case of boards which at present preside at cer-
tain formal proceedings. In exempting boards specially set up "pursuant"
to statute from being replaced by the special trial examiners, the Act is so
vague as easily to encompass an agency opinion that a certain board is
exempt and a disappointed party's opinion that the board is not exempt.
Perhaps most controversial of all, at first, will be the interpretation of
Section 10 on judicial review. The view giving teeth to the section will be
argued by every disappointed party looking for a means of reversing the
agency decision.
Though the new legal requirements are not extensive, agencies will with-
out doubt make every effort to comply with the Act's spirit as set forth in
the committee reports and the provisions addressed to agency discretion,
if only to forestall further legislation by a Congress which has shown itself
ready and willing to impose more stringent measures if these are deemed to
have failed.
204. Substitution of the word "law" for the word "statute" in § 4(b) and § S would
make this a less controversial distinction.
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APPENDIX
CHART OF ADmSTRATIVE PROcF-DuR ACT
Rule Making Adjudication
All: publication-§ 3(a); peti-
tions to alter rules-§ 4(d).
Informal Substantive only: notice, par-
ticipation, statement of "basis
and purpose," 30-day delay be-
tween publication and taking
effect-§ 4.
All: publication-§ 3(a); peti- Notice, informal settlement,
tions to alter rules-§ 4(d). separation of functions-§ 5;
hearing-§§ 7, 11; interme-Formal Substantive only: notice--§ 4 diate and final decision-§ 8;
(a); hearing-§§ 7, 11; inter- declaratory orders-§ 5(d).
mediate and final decision-§ 8;
30-day delay between publica-
tion and taking effect-§ 4(c).
General Provisions
§ 3-Public information.
§ 6-Ancillary matters: right to counsel, appear-
ances, subpenas, denials.
§ 9-Sanctions and powers, license revocations.
§ 10-Judicial review: availability, interim relief,
scope.
§ 12-Construction and effect, dates of taking effect,
separability clause.
